Introduction
In this paper we reconsider the foundations of modal logic, following Martin-L of's methodology of distinguishing judgments from propositions ML85]. We give constructive meaning explanations for necessity (2) and possibility (3). This exercise yields a simple and uniform system of natural deduction for intuitionistic modal logic which does not exhibit anomalies found in other proposals. We also give a new presentation of lax logic FM97] and nd that it is already contained in modal logic, using the decomposition of the lax modality A as 32A and lax implication A ) B as (2A) B. Through a computational interpretation of proofs in modal logic we further obtain a new formulation of Moggi's computational -calculus Mog91], combining and systematizing previous work by S. Kobayashi Kob97] and Benton, Bierman, and de Paiva BBdP98].
At the level of judgments, the above development requires surprisingly few primitive notions. In particular, we only need hypothetical judgments to explain implication, and categorical judgments to explain the modalities. We have thus obtained a satisfactory foundation for the constructive understanding of modal logic and its computational interpretations.
Judgments and Propositions
In his Sienna lectures from 1983 ML85], Martin-L of provides a foundation for logic based on a clear separation of the notions of judgment and proposition. He reasons that to judge is to know and that an evident judgment is an object of knowledge. A proof is what makes a judgment evident. In logic, we make particular judgments such as \A is a proposition" or \A is true", presupposing in the latter case that A is already known to be a proposition. To know that \A is a proposition" means to know what counts as a veri cation of A, whereas to know that \A is true" means to know how to verify A. In his words ML85,
The meaning of a proposition is determined by .
. . ] what counts as a veri cation of it.
This approach leads to a clear conceptual priority: we rst need to understand the notions of judgment and evidence for judgments, then the notions of proposition and veri cations of propositions to understand truth.
As an example, we consider the explanation of conjunction. We know that A^B is a proposition if both A and B are propositions. From the explanation above it should be clear that the two elimination rules are sound: if we de ne the meaning of conjunction by its introduction rule then we are fully justi ed in concluding that A is true if A^B is true, and similarly for the second rule.
Soundness guarantees that the elimination rules are not too strong. We have su cient evidence for the judgment in the conclusion if we have su cient evidence for the judgment in the premise. This is witnessed by a local reduction which constructs evidence for the conclusion from evidence for the premise. A symmetric reduction exists for^E R . We only consider each elimination immediately preceded by an introduction for a connective. We therefore call the property that each such pattern can be reduced local soundness.
The dual question, namely if the elimination rules are su ciently strong, has, as far as I know, not been discussed by Martin-L of. Of course, we can never achieve \absolute" completeness of rules for inferring evident judgments as demonstrated by G odel. But in some situations, elimination rules may be obviously incomplete. For example, we might have overlooked the second elimination rule for conjunction,^E R . This would not contradict soundness, but we would not be able to exploit the knowledge that A^B is true to its fullest. In particular, we cannot recover the knowledge that B is true even if we know that A^B is true.
In general we say that the elimination rules for a connective are locally complete if we can apply the elimination rules to a judgment to recover enough knowledge to permit reconstruction of the original judgment. In the case of conjunction, this is only possible if we have both elimination rules.
We call this pattern a local expansion since we obtain more complex evidence for the original judgment.
An alternative way to understand local completeness is to reconsider our meaning explanation of conjunction. We have said that a veri cation of A^B consists of a veri cation of A and a veri cation of B. Local completeness entails that it is always possible to bring the veri cation of A^B into this form by a local expansion. To summarize, logic is based on the notion of judgment where an evident judgment is an object of knowledge. A judgment can be immediately evident or, more typically, mediately evident, in which case the evidence is provided by a proof. The meaning of a proposition is given by what counts as a veri cation of it. This is written out in the form of introduction rules for logical connectives which allow us to conclude when propositions are true. They are complemented by elimination rules which allow us to obtain further knowledge from the knowledge of compound propositions. The elimination rules for a connective should be locally sound and complete in order to have a satisfactory meaning explanation for the connective. Local soundness and completeness are witnessed by local reductions and expansions of proofs, respectively.
Note that there are other ways to de ne meaning. For example, we frequently expand our language by notational de nition. In intuitionistic logic negation is often given as a derived concept, where :A is considered a notation for A ?. This means that negation has a rather weak status, as its meaning relies entirely on the meaning of implication and falsehood rather than having an independent explanation. The two should not be mixed: introduction and elimination rules for a connective should rely solely on judgmental concepts and not on other connectives. Sometimes (as in the case of negation) a connective can be explained directly or as a notational de nition and we can establish that the two meanings coincide.
Hypothetical Judgments and Implication
So far we have seen two forms of judgment: \A is a proposition" and \A is true". These are insu cient to explain implication, since we would like to say that A B is true if B is true whenever A is true. For this we need hypothetical judgments and hypothetical proofs, which are new primitive notions. We simplify the account of hypothetical judgments by Martin-L of by presupposing that subjects A and B are known to be propositions without making this explicit.
We write the general form of a hypothetical judgment as J 1 ; : : : ; J n`J which expresses \J assuming J 1 through J n " or \J under hypotheses J 1 through J n ". We also refer to J 1 ; : : : ; J n as the antecedents and J as the succedent of the hypothetical judgment.
We explain the meaning by explaining what constitutes evidence for such a hypothetical judgment, namely a hypothetical proof. In a hypothetical proof of the judgment above we can use the hypotheses J i as if we knew them. We can consequently substitute an arbitrary derivation of J i for the uses of a hypothesis J i to obtain a judgment which no longer depends on J i . Thus, at the core, the meaning of hypothetical judgments relies upon substitution on the level of proofs, that is, supplanting the use of a hypothesis by evidence for it.
The rst particular form of hypothetical judgment we need here is We emphasize that the substitution principle should not be viewed as an inference rule, but a property de ning hypothetical judgments. Therefore it should hold for any system of connectives and inference rules we devise. The correctness of the hypothesis rule, for example, can be seen from the substitution principle by adjoining unused hypotheses to the rst derivation. In this paper we will not discuss the details of structural properties of collections of hypotheses such as weakening, exchange, or contraction. 1 There is a small ambiguity here which arises since we may not be able to identify particular uses of hypotheses if there are several identical hypotheses. This will be resolved through the introduction of proof terms in Section 6.
Categorical Judgments and Validity
Now that we have introduced hypothetical judgments, we can single out categorical judgments, a term which goes back to Kant. In our situation they are judgments which do not depend on hypotheses about the truth of propositions.
We introduce the new judgment that A is valid (written A valid), presupposing that A is a proposition. Evidence for the validity of A is simply unconditional evidence for A. We use \ " to indicate an empty collection of hypotheses. We use the semi-colon for visual clarity, and write for a collection of validity assumptions. In the rules, we restrict ourselves to proving judgments of the form A true (rather than A valid), which is possible since the latter is directly de ned in terms of the former. The meaning of hypothetical judgments yields the general substitution principle:
If `B valid and ; B valid`J then `J .
Rewriting the rst part in terms of truth, and making additional assumptions on truth explicit rather than absorbing them into J, we obtain the following version used in the remainder of this paper.
Substitution Principle for Validity
If ; `B true and ; B valid; ?`J then ; ?`J.
We also have a generalized hypothesis rule, again expressed in a form which establishes truth rather than validity, which can be justi ed from the de nition of validity. hyp ; B valid; 0 ; ?`B true It is sound, since evidence for the validity of B consists of a proof of B true from no assumptions about truth, to which we can adjoin the hypotheses 0 and ?. The next step is to internalize the categorical judgment as a proposition.
We write 2A for the proposition expressing that A is valid.
A prop 2F 2A prop We follow the convention that 2 binds more tightly than , so that 2A B stands for (2A) B. The introduction rule just allows the step from the validity of A to the truth of 2A, according to the de nition of validity.
; `A true 2I
; ?`2A true
The elimination rule is considerably more di cult to construct. This concludes the treatment of validity and propositions of the form 2A. In order to discuss the computational interpretations of 2A, we reexamine the rules with a proof term assignment in Section 6.
Necessity can be characterized axiomatically by the following three axioms (see, for example, Vig97, Kob97, AdPR98]), together with the inference rule of necessitation which allows`2A true to be derived from`A true.
The derivations of these axioms in natural deduction is given in Section 6 in abbreviated form as proof terms.
We conclude this section with a remark on two of Prawitz's formulations of natural deduction for modal logic Pra65 ?`A true This pair of rules is locally sound, but not complete. Moreover, it violates the interpretation of ?`A true as a hypothetical judgment, since hyp P; P 2Q`P 2Q hyp P; P 2Q`P E P; P 2Q`2Q and hyp 2Q`2Q 2I 1 2Q`22Q but after substitution of the rst derivation for uses of 2Q in the second we obtain an invalid derivation: hyp P; P 2Q`P 2Q hyp P; P 2Q`P E P; P 2Q`2Q 2I 1 ? P; P 2Q`22Q A related lack of normal forms was noted by Prawitz himself and he introduced two further systems. The third system is related to the one by Bierman ?`2A true with a side condition enforcing that the derivation of the premise can be decomposed as in Bierman and de Paiva's formulation.
The failure of the substitution property in the rst formulation can be traced to the restriction of the introduction rule to assumptions of the form 2A i true when it should be A i valid. The revised version is still less than satisfactory since it requires a simultaneous substitution, either in the syntax or in the side condition.
Possibility
We may view hypotheses A 1 true; : : : ; A n true as describing knowledge of a given world. The judgment that A is valid can then be interpreted as expressing that A is true in a world about which we know nothing. In other words, A is necessarily true. Note that by verifying the truth of A without presupposing any knowledge, we can speak of necessary truth without circumscribing the totality of all conceivable worlds. The reasoning remains purely logical.
A dual concept is that of possible truth. We say that A is possibly true if there is a world in which A is true. Unlike in classical logic, we have no reason to expect that possible truth would be de nable propositionally in terms of necessary truth. It also appears di cult to analyze this concept judgmentally without reference to the existence of particular worlds. And yet it is possible to do so by employing a combination of hypothetical and categorical judgments. The critical insight for necessity came from considering how to establish that A is valid. Here we take the opposite approach and consider how to use the knowledge that A is possibly true. It means that there is a world in which A is true, but about which we know nothing else. Therefore, if we assume that A is true (but nothing else) and then conclude that C is possible, then C must also be possible without this assumption. If we write A poss for the judgment that A is possible we obtain:
If A poss and A true`C poss then C poss. Note that we can only draw conclusions regarding the possibility of C, but not its truth. In the end, the only way we can establish that A is possible is to show that A is true. We are interested in considering both necessity and possibility together. They interact because they are both concerned with truth, relativized to worlds. If we decide that they both should refer to the same worlds, then the de nition of possible truth is extended by allowing assumptions about validity.
De nition of Possibility with Necessity In part (2), the validity assumptions are available for deriving C poss from A true. This is because they are true in all worlds and therefore, in particular, in the one in which A is assumed to be true. Note that part (2) has the form of a substitution principle and will be used as such.
For the consideration of validity we needed to introduce a new form of hy- Instead of an explicit inference rule, we permit the use of the stronger premises A true and C true in the introduction and elimination rules, respectively. This is akin to the direct use of an assumption A valid to conclude that A true in the extended hypothesis rule. We write 3I and 3E for these derived rules.
Local soundness can be seen from the following local reduction. Possibility can be characterized axiomatically by the following axioms.
A 3A truè 33A 3A truè 2(A B) (3A 3B) true Natural deductions for these axioms are given in abbreviated form as proof terms in the next section.
6 Analytic and Synthetic Judgments
In ML94], Martin-L of reviews the notions of analytic and synthetic judgments as analyzed by Kant. He states:
: : :] an analytic judgement is one which is evident in virtue of the meanings of the terms that occur in it.
The judgment A prop is analytic in this sense since we can easily construct evidence for the knowledge that A is a proposition from A itself without additional insight. However, the judgment A true is not analytic, but synthetic: we need to look outside the judgment itself for evidence, typically by searching for a proof of A. Proofs are essential in our use of logic in computer science, since they contain constructions and algorithms with computational contents. Therefore Martin-L of bases his type theory ML80] on several analytical judgments.
Again, we simplify 2 and consider \M is a proof term for A" (written M : A).
It is important that M contain enough information to reconstruct the evidence for A true in the sense we have discussed so far. Consequently, the notions of local soundness and completeness, witnessed by local reductions and expansion, can now be rendered on the proof terms M.
We will not repeat the full construction of the rules above, but merely summarize them in their analytic form. First, conjunction. We will freely switch back and forth between the view of M as a proof and A as a proposition, or M as a term and A as its type. For the reductions we presuppose that each left-hand side is well-typed, which means the each corresponding right-hand side will also be well-typed and have the same type. This follows from the meaning explanation of conjunction given in its synthetic form.
For hypothetical judgments we label the assumptions with variables and write x:A for \x is a proof term for A". We continue to use ? to stand for a collection of hypotheses, now labeled, and call it a context. We suppose that all variables x declared in a context are di erent. We tacitly employ renaming to guarantee this invariant. Note that a judgment ?`A true is parametric in all variables declared in ? and thus combines the parametric and hypothetical judgment forms. The rules for implication are annotated in the well-known manner, using functions and applications to realize implication introduction and elimination, respectively. ; x:A`E C 3E ; ?`let dia x = M in E C let dia x = dia E in F =) R h hE =xiiF M : 3A =) E dia (let dia x = M in x) The substitution operation h hE =xiiF must be de ned in a non-standard way as hinted above. . It has also been related to the computational -calculus BBdP98], which we will examine in the next section, and to higher-order de nitions of logical connectives Acz99].
We develop here the fragment of lax logic containing implication A ) B and the lax modality A. We use a di erent notation for implication than in modal logic, so we may later give the connective a di erent interpretation as lax implication. We will give two di erent explanations of lax logic. The rst characterizes lax truth via judgments in the manner of the preceding sections. Our starting points are just the concepts of truth and hypothetical judgments. In particular, the presentation is independent of modal logic and categorical judgments. The second explanation uses necessity and possibility to show that lax truth is a derived notion, already available in modal logic. The fact that our formulation is equivalent to the standard formulation is proven in Section 8, where we also exhibit translations between proof terms.
We begin with a judgmental de nition of lax truth. We have a new judgment, A lax for a proposition A. We may think of A lax as stating that A is true subject to some constraints, without making explicit relative to which system of constraints.
De nition of Lax Truth and then use modal logic for reasoning in lax logic. Since the rules of lax logic are derived (and not just admissible), we can retain the structure of proofs in the translation. We make this explicit in Section 8, where we revisit the above embedding, including proof terms.
In terms of the interpretation of A as \A is true under some constraints", we can read 2A as \A is de nitely true (without constraints)" and 3A as \A may be true (subject to some constraints)". The lax implication A ) B expresses \if A is true without constraints, then B is true". This decomposition is natural: in lax logic, every proposition is either de nitely true, or true under some constraints. In modal logic, no such strong commitment is made and we can reason from hypotheses which may or may not be subject to constraints.
It remains to see if we can characterize lax implication and the lax modality directly in modal logic via introduction and elimination rules which are locally sound and complete and equivalent to the de nitions above.
For lax implication, this is easy to achieve and verify.
; ; ?`B true In the elimination rule we use ; `A true to express that `A valid, as in the introduction rule for necessity. Local soundness and completeness can be veri ed using the substitution principle for validity from Section 4. These rules are well-known from linear logic programming HM94], because in linear logic with a modal operator ! (which corresponds to 2 in our setting), goal-directed search is incomplete. Replacing it by the analogue of lax implication avoids this problem and allows the use of intuitionistic linear logic as the basis of a logic programming language.
The lax modality is more di cult to characterize by introduction and elimination rules in the presence of necessity and possibility and seems to require a new judgment A lax which we can also read as A is possibly necessary. This follows the blueprint of the de nition of the lax modality, except that the interaction with the judgments of possibility and necessity requires laws relating them. In practice, it would seem preferable to either reason directly in lax logic as de ned at the beginning of the section, or to reason in modal logic with the de ned modality of A = 32A and corresponding derived rules of inference.
8 Computational -Calculus Moggi Mog89, Mog91] proposed the computational -calculus as a general foundation for the semantics of programming languages with functions and e ects. The computational -calculus separates, in the type system, values from computations, where the latter may have e ects. The computational -calculus abstracts from any particular notion of e ect (such as update of mutable references, or raising of exceptions). In this way, it is similar to modal logic which reasons about necessity and possibility, but abstracts from any particular collection of worlds.
Benton, Biermann and de Paiva BBdP98] showed that the computational -calculus is connected to lax logic via proof term assignment. We show the relevant fragment of the calculus here. We use the notation of lax logic, writing A for the computations of type A, rather than TA or MA. However, these do not su ce as the basis for an operational semantics, because of the unusual elimination rule for the lax modality. We need the following additional rule, which does not fall into the class of local reductions but has the form of a commuting reduction.
let val x 2 = (let val x 1 = e 1 in e 2 ) in e =) C let val x 1 = e 1 in (let val x 2 = e 2 in e)
The local expansions are not computationally relevant, but correspond to extensionality. They are less problematic. e : A ) B =) E x:A: e x e : A =) E let val x = e in val x
We can x the anomaly in the reduction relation through the judgmental reconstruction of lax logic in Section 7. We have two judgment forms M : A (M is a proof of A true) and E : A (E is a proof of A lax). The de nition of the lax modality yields the following principles. The following two mutually recursive translations from terms in the computational -calculus to lax terms have several desirable properties, as we demonstrate below. e ] is de ned for arbitrary well-typed terms e, while e > is de ned only for terms e whose type has the form A. We write L ( ) RE for the congruence relation generated by local reductions and expansions in the lax -calculus, and C ( ) C and C ( ) REC for the congruence relations generated by commuting conversion, and local reduction, expansion, and commuting conversion, respectively, in the computational -calculus. We also write`C andL for hypothetical judgments in the computational -calculus and lax logic, respectively.
Theorem 2 (Computational -Calculus and Lax Logic) Proof: The typing properties (1) and (2) follow by an easy simultaneous induction on the de nition of the translations, using inversion on the given typing derivations. Part (3) con rms that the commuting reduction of the computationalcalculus is not necessary in our formulation of lax logic|terms which di er by commuting reductions are actually equal (modulo the possible renaming of bound variables as usual). This is easy to show by direct calculation, using the property that hhE 1 =x 1 iE 2 =x 2 iE 3 = hE 1 =x 1 i(hE 2 =x 2 iE 3 ) if x 1 occurs only in E 2 and x 2 only in E 3 .
Part (4) We also conjecture a strong relationship between reduction sequences in the two calculi under the given translation, even though a direct simulation theorem fails. A further study of computational behavior is beyond the scope of this paper.
As an alternative to a direct term assignment for lax logic, we can use the embedding of lax logic in modal logic to give an account of the computational -calculus in modal logic. A proposal along similar lines has been made by Kobayashi Kob97] , with an emphasis on a categorical semantics. His natural deduction formulation, and therefore his programming language concepts, are not satisfactory. In particular, his system requires simultaneous substitutions in two rules to model validity (as in BdP96]), and also has a somewhat unmotivated interaction between possibility and falsehood. Our formulation below eliminates the rst de ciency and can be extended to avoid the second.
We show the embedding from Section 7 on proof terms. First, we recall the embedding of propositions.
(A ) B) + 
We write M L =) R N for local reduction in the lax -calculus, and M M =) R N for local reduction in the modal -calculus. Moreover, we write M M =) R N for an arbitrary number reductions. As before we use ( ) RE for the congruence relation generated by local reduction and expansion.
Theorem 3 (Lax -Calculus in Modal -Calculus)
9 Commuting Conversions and Normal Forms
In this paper, we do not carry out a full study of possible equational theories for the proof term calculus underlying modal logic. However, to understand proof search and computational interpretations of a logic, it is important to understand the notion of a normal form and the reductions necessary to transform a term into normal form. We view this as an extension of the local soundness and completeness properties from individual inference rules to the full logic. In our view, normal derivations arise from a judgmental decomposition of truth, based on the form of evidence provided. A minimal requirement for a direct proof of a proposition A is that it should be based entirely on constituent propositions of A. We will impose an even stronger condition derived from the meaning explanation of the connectives: a proof is normal if it decomposes the available assumptions by means of elimination rules and then assembles a proof of the conclusion by means of introduction rules. Viewed in terms of proof search: we work backwards from the goal by using introduction rules and forwards from the hypotheses by elimination rules. Since introduction and elimination rules are independent of each other, the notion can be de ned separately for each propositional connective.
Note that a derivation may not have a local redex, yet may fail to be normal. ; x#A`E * C 3E ; ?`let dia x = M in E * C The for 2E does not apply here, since we cannot apply an elimination rule to the judgment C poss. Therefore, no commuting reductions are needed.
The main theorem now states that normal deductions as de ned above contain no redices, and vice versa. Proof: From left to right we generalize the statement to include extraction proofs and then proceed by simultaneous induction on the structure of the given derivations, using extensive case analysis. From right to left the theorem follows by case analysis on local or commuting reductions.
The calculus further satis es a normalization theorem. This can be proven either directly via Tait's method as in Pra71], by a detour via cut elimination as in Pfe99], via CPS translation as in dG99], or via an interpretation into a simply-typed lambda-calculus with disjunction BBdP98]. The latter is in many ways the simplest and easily extends to additional connectives. We map both 2A and 3A as > _ A so that commuting reductions can be modeled in the target calculus. Formal statements and proofs of these results are beyond the scope of this paper.
We further conjecture that our modal -calculus permits long normal forms. These are de ned by restricting the transition from extractions to normal derivations to atomic propositions.
; ?`M # P #"
; ?`M " P This might be proven by using the translations between natural deduction and the sequent calculus as in Pfe99], together with a cut elimination argument for modal logic in a formulation based on judgments very similar to the one for linear logic in Pfe94]. At present, we have not veri ed the details of such a construction.
Conclusion
We have presented a judgmental reconstruction of the modal logic of necessity and possibility, leading to a clean and simple formulation of natural deduction and associated proof terms. Because the de nitions of logical connectives are orthogonal in this approach, other propositional connectives can easily be added with their usual introduction and elimination rules. We plan to investigate extensions to rst-order logic and type theory, which require parametric judgments and more attention to the question when propositions are well-formed. We have also left the study of various normalization properties, as well as a formulation of a sequent calculus and cut elimination to a future paper.
Another approach to the explanation of modal logic is via Kripke structures.
This uses the basic judgments \proposition A is true in world w", and \world w 0 is reachable from world w". While more verbose and requiring explicit reasoning about worlds, this approach is also more exible in that various traditional modal logics can be expressed simply by varying the reachability judgment. Vigan o Vig97] has conducted a systematic study of modal logic via Kripke structures from the point of view of logical frameworks. In certain cases this can be simpli ed to obtain a formulation of natural deduction employing a stack of contexts, representing a path through the Kripke structure. Variations of this idea can be found in MM94, PW95, DP99], including a very ne-grained study of reduction in GL96, GL97]. These are natural for some applications of necessity, but it does not appear that similarly compact and elegant versions exist for possibility.
One particularly fruitful interpretation of 2A is as the intensional type for expressions denoting elements of type A. Embedding types of this form in a programming language means that we can compute with expressions as well as values. The term box M quotes the expression M, and the construct let box u = M in N binds u to the expression computed by M and then computes the value of N. The restrictions placed on the introduction rule for 2A mean that a term box M can only refer to other expression variables u but not value variables x. This is consistent with the intensional interpretation of 2A, since we may not know an expression which denotes a given value and therefore cannot permit an arbitrary value as an expression.
The local reduction rules can be extended to an operational semantics by imposing a call-by-name or call-by-value strategy. In either case, we do not permit reductions under a box constructor, since this would violate its intensional nature.
If we choose a call-by-value strategy, we obtain a natural explanation of computation in multiple stages and, at a lower level, run-time code generation DP96, WLPD98, DP99]. Alternatively, we can add constructs for pattern matching against an expression. If we also retain extensionality as given by the local expansions, we can obtain a calculus suitable as a meta-logical framework, that is, a logical framework in which we can reason about the speci ed logics DPS97]. The modal operator here serves to avoid the usual paradoxes which would arise if we incorrectly identify an expression with its denotation.
In this paper we have also shown how lax logic can be embedded naturally in modal logic with necessity and possibility. Following work by S. Kobayashi Kob97] and Benton, Bierman, and de Paiva BBdP98], this yields a new formulation of the computational -calculus. A possible future direction of research is to try to exploit the additional expressive power a orded by the modal logic as a semantic framework when compared to the computational -calculus.
